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ABSTRACT 
 
Behavior Based Threat Assessment as a Tool for the  
Federal Protective Service in Mitigating Directed Violence 
 
 The popular culture behind law enforcement of protecting and serving is slightly 
misrepresented because the majority of law enforcement organizations do not have a protective 
mission but a responsive mission.  Select organizations such as the Federal Protective Service 
(FPS) has more than a responsive, investigative responsibility to the community they police; they 
also have a responsibility to protect their community from potential criminal and terrorist acts 
that have not yet happened.  Utilizing the newest research from the Department of Homeland 
Security and their partnership with mental health providers, the United States Attorney‟s Office 
and scholarly researchers this article provides the FPS a Critical Path To Violence model to 
better protect the government.  This Critical Path To Violence analyzes an individual‟s 
psychology by observing their behavior through a well defined progression that has been proven 
to lead to violence.  This progression once observed then can be very specifically disrupted to 
prevent violent attacks, while maximizing resources and increasing effectiveness of the FPS 
Special Agents and Inspectors. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been great advancement in the use of both psychological profiling and 
behavior analysis in the world of criminology through applied research.  The Federal Protective 
Service (FPS) / Department of Homeland Security (DHS) now has the opportunity to utilize 
these advancements by bringing together information which identify a "Critical Path to 
Violence" and use this knowledge to mitigate or even prevent future attacks on the federal 
government.  Using both psychological profiling and behavior analysis will provide the ability to 
predict what an individual‟s behavior looks like as they proceed through the psychological 
processes (Critical Path to Violence) necessary to believe that an attack would create positive 
change.  The US Secret Service (USSS) has conducted a vast amount of research on these critical 
paths and has set a precedent for law enforcement organizations that have a protective mission.  
Many other law enforcement organizations have since modeled their investigative techniques 
after the USSSS, such as the US Capital Police, and the US Marshals Service and the Los 
Angeles Police Department.  These departments have adapted this model to their needs by 
creating special sections that focus on identifying these critical paths and mitigating the violence 
that they would otherwise result in.   
The FPS has the organizational structure to facilitate a modified version of this model but 
would require more depth and focus during investigations of threats and the collection/analysis 
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of research information in order to see the significance in the results.  Since protecting from 
directed violence is only a small part of FPS‟ mission, and only one of the many risks that FPS 
mitigates; FPS already has a well thought out organizational structure in place that would lend 
itself to a behavioral analysis program.  Furthermore, FPS has a Threat Management Branch 
(TMB) with senior leadership and a small team of Special Agents in each of the FPS Regions 
which are responsible for investigating directed violence.  The TMB is tasked with dual 
missions: 
 1)   Intelligence collection, analysis and distribution 
 2)   Leading FPS investigative efforts (FPS, 2011) 
 In cases of directed violence these two missions often merge resulting in both an 
intelligence operation to mitigate threat and an investigation of complex criminal investigation.  
The policy that dictates the management of threats is the Protective Investigations Program 
(PIP).  On a webpage for the PIP, FPS explains that this program was created in 2004 with the 
objective of preventing “an attack on persons and facilities designated as FPS protectees” (FPS, 
2011).    FPS believes that this program brings together several of FPS resources to mitigate 
threats including: 
 Initial patrol response by FPS uniformed police officers 
 Full investigation by FPS special agents 
 Prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office or State Prosecutor's Office 
 Physical security enhancements and countermeasures 
 Security briefings and workplace violence seminars administered by FPS law 
enforcement personnel 
 Suspicious surveillance detection initiatives designed to detect pre-incident indicators 
of threats to federal employees and facilities. (FPS, 2011) 
 There are three key problems that FPS routinely sees in implementation of the PIP.  
These problems seem to exacerbate each other.  Firstly, a “full investigation by FPS special 
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agents” (FPS, 2011) does not include behavior based threat assessments and focuses primarily on 
the immediate facts available for the case. Secondly, prosecutors with the U.S. Attorney‟s Office 
or State Prosecutor‟s Office often see threats of directed violence as lesser crimes and thus either 
refuse to prosecute or plead the crimes down to a misdemeanor or even a warning.  The final 
problem at hand is the use of behavioral indicators that have not been well defined, which result 
in surveillance based on the gut instincts of the agents or leadership and not based on empirical 
evidence or statistical probability.  This causes confusion and frustration both on part of the 
agents and the leadership resulting generally in the surveillance not being accomplished due to 
concerns about legality.  Therefore, there is a case for bringing these elements together in a 
behavior based threat assessment process as defined by the USSS.  Such a process would help 
FPS conduct a more thorough investigation that would better identify  mitigation strategies, 
assist with prosecution, and  assess the potential means of the attack for more accurate and 
efficient surveillance.   
Statement of the Problem 
 The Federal Protective Service (FPS) / Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should 
advance its understanding of threat based behavior by developing a standardized Critical Path to 
Violence (CPV) towards government facilities.  This CPV would assist agents in understanding, 
communicating and documenting the behaviors that lead to threatening behavior or actions.  This 
better understanding would create a greater awareness of the most efficient methods for 
mitigating threats.  FPS is responsible for over 9,000 different properties and these properties see 
over 1,000,000 staff and visitors per day (FPS, 2011).    With over 9000 potential targets for 
criminal and terrorist groups and a law enforcement staff of just over 900, FPS is tasked with a 
virtually impossible mission.  It is imperative that FPS better understand, prioritize and mitigate 
the threats investigated in a manner that is simple, easily understood and effective.  Analyzing 
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the CPV would define  a particular threat through an FPS lens and then predict and quantify what 
the subject‟s future actions may have been had FPS not intervened.  This insight helps with both 
prosecutions and other mitigation strategies.   The current difficulties are best understood 
through the use of the following two examples.  
FPS Current Protective Investigation Program (PIP) 
 John Smith is reported to have threatened “maybe I would get better service if I came in 
with a bomb” according to Social Security Administration (SSA) employees.  FPS responds and 
does a comprehensive interview of employees, retrieves video recording of the incident and does 
a criminal history check of Mr. Smith.  The case is passed to a FPS Special Agent who within 24 
hours approaches Mr. Smith‟s house with two local police officers.  Mr. Smith invites the agent 
and officers into his house and consents to a search of his house for bomb making materials.  A 
very basic search is conducted and reveals no items which might be used to make a bomb.  The 
Special Agent  talks to Mr. Smith about the seriousness of making threats and has Mr. Smith sign 
a piece of paper saying that he will not make another threat or could be charged with this threat 
along with other crimes as applicable.  All reports are filled and no other contact with Mr. Smith 
happens unless there is an additional violation of the law. 
FPS Potential Behavior Based Threat Assessment 
 John Smith is reported to have threatened “maybe I would get better service if I came in 
with a bomb” according to Social Security Administration (SSA) employees.  FPS responds and 
does a comprehensive interview of employees, retrieves video recording of the incident and does 
a criminal history check of Mr. Smith.  The case is passed to FPS Special Agents who conducts a 
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Behavior Based Threat Assessment.  FPS agents speak with the SSA supervisors to try and 
understand if there is a grievance.  The supervisors state Mr. Smith used to come in regularly a 
year ago, after he reported that his grandma and grandpa died at fault of the SSA.  Mr. Smith 
reported that payments to the grandma were wrongfully canceled which prevented grandma from 
paying her heat bills.  Her heat was turned off and she died from hypothermia in her sleep.  
Grandpa died  less than a month later of grief.  Supervisors reported that Mr. Smith came in to 
the office daily asking for an apology but refused to fill out the appropriate paperwork to request 
an investigation from SSA.   
 Nine months to a year ago Mr. Smith stopped coming into the office until the day  of the 
threat.  When he came in recently, he appeared very cold, angry and looked like he had been 
drinking.  He immediately asked for a supervisor and when told one was not available he started 
cursing and stated “I bet you I would get better service if I had a bomb”.  He then turned and left.  
Searches of public information revealed that 9 months ago Mr. Smith sold his home in a suburb 
of Denver and moved to a very small town where there is known to be a large, boisterous, anti-
government group.   
 Mr. Smith was reported to have worked for ABC Company prior to his moving to this 
small town.  Agents spoke with Mr. Smith‟s previous supervisor at ABC Company who stated 
Mr. Smith was a great guy until that unfortunate accident.  He quickly began coming to work 
drunk and associating with some not good people from somewhere in the mountains.  He talked 
a lot about how bad the government was and that he wished there was a way he could fix all of 
his problems.  Interviews with other contacts from this time period revealed the same shift in 
attitude.   
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 Based on the more in depth interviews an SSA employee felt more comfortable reporting 
additional suspicious behavior and informed the agents that he saw Mr. Smith just sitting in his 
car by the employee parking lot.  This type of information is often deemed unimportant by non 
law enforcement as they do not see the significance in the behavior, where as if they feel they 
have a relationship with the law enforcement staff then they can call directly and ask if the 
observation is important.  The employee stated that he sat there for over an hour while the 
employee was at lunch as he was still there when the employee came back from lunch.  Agents 
received a search warrant for Mr. Smith‟s house to include bomb making materials, other 
weapons and items used to plan an attack such as notebooks, photographs and digital evidence 
from his personal computer.  Agents serve the warrant and find several hand written notebook 
with comments regarding ideation and plans for potential attacks, communications through a 
website known to law enforcement to teach individuals how to build bombs, photographs of 
employees of the SSA to include them at work and at home and a newly purchased semi 
automatic pistol with  extended magazines.  The interview with Mr. Smith shows that he is still 
deeply concerned with the state of the government and that his new friends are helping him to 
understand the injustice against him.  He is still deeply injured by the original event and does not 
believe there is any way to fix that.  He denies that he was going to attack the SSA office. 
 
Obviously, not every case looks like the one above but with the current PIP there is not 
enough time or resources dedicated to the case to determine the full facts involved.  At this point 
the agents have enough to arrest Mr. Smith for the threat but may also be able to look at other 
avenues to mitigate the threat.  These might include grief counseling, or arranging for an apology 
from the SSA, both of which may help to mitigate the threat.  Putting Mr. Smith in jail without 
another mitigation strategy will most likely just delay the threat and not fully mitigate it. 
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Overview of the Problem 
Threats are simple in origin to the mind of the threat maker but are difficult for law 
enforcement to understand or document.  According to Merriam Webster, the definition of a 
threat is “an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage”, however the Latin root‟s 
meaning maybe more relevant in that it means to push or thrust (Merriam, 2011).  Therefore to 
study the psychology of threats would also include the study of human behavior regarding 
threats.  The reason for a threat is often personal and is generally known to the threat maker.  
Threats may originate from distress, fear, hatred or even disgust.  Out of all of the different types 
of directed violence, threats are perhaps the most important for psychological examination for a 
couple of reasons.  First it is the predecessor to other forms of violence. Even though threats can 
cause emotional harm they do not generally cause extreme physical harm to the individual being 
threatened.  If an individual was to kill during the act of threatening, then there would be no need 
to threaten.  Secondly, individuals that have already committed themselves to an act of violence 
have created other means for law enforcement to catch them and for the criminal justice system 
to administer justice.  Lastly, threats are often down played by law enforcement because they are 
difficult to quantify, document and present to a judge.   
For the purposes of this document, there will be no distinction between terrorist threats 
and any other threat of violence other than it is directed towards the federal government.  It is 
interesting to note that in the context of threats, terrorists in the generic regard have already made 
threats and law enforcement is mitigating their potential attacks.  Even though on an individual 
level some members of terrorist groups may still be at the very beginning of their Critical Path to 
Violence but are acting on the previous threat somebody else made.  However, there are 
opportunities for new groups, lone wolf type individuals, home grown terrorists or even non-
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terroristic individuals to make threats and display behaviors that are just as devastating as 
international terrorist attacks.  Law enforcement must continue to assess these threats as they are 
made known and must be quantified so senior leadership, the criminal courts systems and the 
society in its entirety can make decisions about how to protect ourselves.  Without performing 
some type of psychological assessment of the threat maker, how will law enforcement know the 
level of seriousness of the threat?   
Purpose of the Project 
 To provide the Federal Protective Service (FPS) with a list of behaviors that when in a 
specific chronological order indicates an increased likelihood that the suspect will commit an act 
of violence.  This project will also provide an ability to determine the applicability of behavior 
based analysis in law enforcement organizations that currently do not have such programs but 
have a protective mission.  This will be accomplished by comparing historical examples of 
violence against the US Government to the US Secret Service‟s Critical Path to Violence model.  
In doing this a quick reference guide for investigating directed violence against federal property 
will be created. Furthermore, a list of case studies will demonstrate the applicability of the 
behavior based threat assessment models.  Lastly the project will result in a formal 
recommendation to FPS as to how to efficiently integrate these tools into the current Protective 
Investigations Program (PIP) and provide some limited examples of how a behavioral analysis 
program could be utilized as a strategic tool. 
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List of Definitions 
Directed Violence – Violence that is directed at a specific target based on a previous grievance.   
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Is the department of the US Government that is 
 responsible for protection of the homeland. 
Federal Protective Service – Is the agency within the DHS that is responsible for the protection  
 of federally owned, leased or occupied property. 
Threat – The communication that identifies the potential for violence. 
Risk Factors – The observable indicators that allow an investigator to identify behaviors or 
 psychology that relates to directed violence. 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) – A conglomeration of federal, state and local agencies 
 that work together to investigate crimes of terrorism.  Each individual JTTF is managed 
 by the regional FBI offices, FPS participates in the JTTF on both local and national 
 levels. 
US Secret Service – Agency within the DHS that is responsible for protecting specific 
 dignitaries to include the President of the United States.  Also responsible for several 
 research projects that helped evolve law enforcement‟s use of behavior analysis and the 
 Critical Path to Violence. 
United States Code – The criminal laws that are enforced by most federal law enforcement 
 including the FPS. 
10 
 
Terrorism – The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons 
 or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
 thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”. 
Violence – An expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage (Merriam, 2011). 
Critical Path to Violence – A list of behaviors exhibited in chronological order which 
 demonstrates the psychological ability to commit acts of violence.  
Chapter Summary 
 After a violent attack everyone wants to be able to say that they did everything they could 
to prevent or mitigate the attack.  Since research began in the mid 1990‟s, USSS and their 
partners have developed a new tool for assessing threats of violence.  The behavioral based threat 
assessment has been fully adopted by the USSS and the USSS is often seen as the primer 
protective law enforcement organization in the world.   Their lessons learned and direct research 
is available to other law enforcement organizations such as the FPS to use to better enhance their 
protective missions.  The USSS did not find easy to implement these new processes; however 
FPS is organizationally well suited to incorporate behavioral based threat assessments.  In order 
to make this an improved mitigation strategy there must be the ability to conduct applied 
research in cooperation with FPS in order to determine what unique behavioral traits are 
exhibited prior to an attack on federal property.  This project is the first step in identifying that 
Critical Path to Violence and developing a plan to create additional research opportunities 
resulting in a positive change in FPS‟s ability to investigate, prosecute and mitigate cases of 
directed violence.  
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Chapter 2 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In order to better understand the issues surrounding directed violence, behavioral based 
threat assessments, the Critical Paths to Violence (CPV) concept and the incorporation of these 
concepts into a federal law enforcement entity such as the FPS, I conducted a thorough review of 
literature.  This review included over 70 articles of peer reviewed research in various aspects of 
psychology and behavior based threat assessments.  As applying the research from psychology 
and criminology is relatively new to law enforcement, the first area of concern was the ability for 
federal law enforcement to combine applied research, psychology, and criminology into a 
functional multi-disciplinary organizational model.  
Research In Federal Law Enforcement 
Integrating Research and Practice in Federal Law Enforcement: Secret Service 
Applications of Behavioral Science Expertise to Protect the President was published in 
Behavioral Science and the Law magazine in 1998 and written by Dr. Margaret Coggins, Dr. 
Marisa Pynchon and Dr. Joel Dvoskin.  The article discusses specific areas of growth between 
professional, scientific researchers and the US Secret Service (USSS) as it pertains to behavioral 
analysis in threat investigations.  The USSS and the various partnerships they have created in 
analyzing behavior of individuals that pose a threat to protected individuals is considered the 
most advanced in both psychological scientific research and criminology fields concerning 
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violence.  The article explains the importance of developing this partnership is to first understand 
their symbiotic relationship.  Researchers need firsthand accounts and information of potential 
acts of violence to research as the events are unfolding to make predictions and study the results.  
Whereas, law enforcement needs the researchers analysis to use in court to prevent potential 
future acts of violence, to justify their actions and to ultimately mitigate the threat.  Within the 
USSS the result of this partnership was the National Threat Assessment Center‟s (NTAC) 
Exception Case Study Project. 
 The article identified a couple key problems with integrating both law enforcement and 
psychological researcher into projecting targeted violence.  First is that law enforcement 
agencies are not trained in managing crime proactively and is not well suited to quantifying 
threats.  Threats are generally seen as a lesser crime and in the eyes of the courts are generally 
considered misdemeanors, meaning that there is less emphasis placed on the conviction of these 
crimes.  Still, the Los Angeles Police Department, US Capital Police and the US Marshals 
Service have created proactive programs to investigate targeted violence.  “Each of these 
organizations has recognized that their mission extends well beyond purely investigating and 
enforcement responsibilities, to the much more daunting task of protection and the prevention of 
violence” (Coggins, pg. 3, 1998).  The recognition of this additional role has created professional 
groups such as the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP), which helps to 
develop partnerships between clinical psychologists, criminologists, threat assessment 
professionals and law enforcement.  Both researchers and law enforcement are beginning to 
understand that the importance of investigating targeted violence to include stalking, harassment 
and threats.  The understanding of the subject‟s thoughts and behaviors towards the victims and 
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understanding them in relation to risk management solutions available to law enforcement is 
becoming essential to risk management strategies. 
 The USSS‟s protective intelligence program has five key functions:   
1)  Identifying subjects who may pose a risk to one or more Secret Service protectees 
2)  Investigating the circumstances in which the threat occurred and the individual      
      histories of    the persons who may have made or posed the perceived threat   
3)  Evaluating the mental status of the subject 
4)  Assessing both the likelihood and the severity of risk posed by the subject, and 
 5)  Implementing case management-type interventions aimed at managing those subjects       
            who have been evaluated by the Secret Service as presenting a danger to Secret   
           Service Protectees  (Coggin, pg. 8, 1998). 
 
Because of the USSS protective mission there was a focus on understanding the relationships and 
patterns of mental health as part of the evaluation and this focus created the need for applied 
research within the USSS.   
In order to be able to make more informed decisions about the risks they were managing 
the USSS contracted with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) as a partner for a conference on 
behavioral health for clinicians and law enforcement.  Throughout the 1980‟s the USSS created a 
partnership with IOM that lead to more formalized liaison and research between the two groups.  
The partnership built a branch of the USSS called the Behavioral Research Program which was 
tasked with researching behavior and psycho-legal issues that might affect the USSS and their 
mission.  The goals of this program included assessing the risk of individuals that may be a threat 
to protectees, study the factors that influence agent's judgments in evaluating risk posed by 
threats, study the attitude of mental health professionals in working with the USSS to mitigate 
violence, and study the impact of mental health law on the USSS and its ability to meet its goals. 
 Challenges found in partnering with the USSS included working on very time sensitive 
and secret projects with differing focus on research and responsibilities.  Also, applying the 
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research and incorporating it into policy that impacted the mission caused “significant growing 
pains” (Coggins, 1998).  This was partially alleviated by encouraging the participation of both 
internal and external resources into the Research Advisory Committee.  The committee‟s 
leadership would set research goals and facilitate the delicate balance of information and 
relationships between agents and researchers.  The members would then provide regular input 
into the research process, mental health and criminal law, and policy as it pertained to the 
mission.  One of the largest challenges that faced the committee was the need to ensure that the 
research was based on empirical, scientific study methods and external review was necessary to 
the organization‟s successes and not a “liability or intrusion to the law enforcement process” 
(Coggins, pg 12, 1998).  The committees‟ ability to merge non-traditional research and applied 
processes created a widely respectable research program and shows the value in partnering 
psychological research with criminology.  Their activity is credited with creating the next 
evolution in risk management concerning directed violence (described below in Threat 
Assessments). 
Directed Violence  
Dr. Randy Borum, Associate Professor and Director of the Psychology of Terrorism 
Initiative at the University of South Florida explains that Directed violence, like terrorism, is not 
easily defined (Borum, 2004).  Dr. Borum‟s interest is in the study of terrorism as a more 
transparent means for studying directed violence illustrates the behavioral aspects of violence.  
Dr. Borum further states that terrorist use a wide variety of criminal activity to support their 
operation but nearly all definitions of terrorism include the use or the threatened use of violence.  
In order to understand this violence Dr Borum provided his research on the history of the 
psychological research on violence. 
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Understanding violence seems to be just as difficult as understanding terrorism.  As Dr. 
Borum explains, definitions of violence are just as vague as terrorism.  He explains this by giving 
a variety of examples which include domestic violence, sexual predators, violence towards 
children, suicide bombers and homegrown terrorists; all of which have extremely different 
circumstances, emotional reactions to their stress and have various levels of violent behavior.  
However, most of society would contend that all the examples given are or could be violent.  Dr. 
Borum explains “What might „cause‟ or „explain‟ behavior in one of these cases, might not in 
another.  The point here is not to resolve the longstanding definitional debate, but to illustrate 
how the way in which practitioners and researchers view the problem of violence (and how it) 
affects practical issues and decisions in the „real world‟” (Borum, 2004).  Concerning threats we 
must identify the practical issues that affect the threat maker, the victim, and the responding 
agencies before we can make any type of substantial change in the psychology of threats. 
 Dr. Borum describes five basic theories that have been used to explain violence.  The 
first being Instinct Theory which was partially realized by Freud who explained that there was a 
balance of life and death in every person‟s life and that when disturbed, the death (or violence) 
was transposed onto society.  Similarly, under the Instinct Theory inferences are drawn to the 
animal kingdom which describes animals as needing a certain amount of death to survive and 
thus humanity is programmed to maintain this balance.  The second theory is the Drive Theory 
which states there is a direct correlation between frustration and aggression.   However, Dr. 
Borum explains that this theory is not all inclusive because there are many incidents were 
frustration does not result in aggression and where aggression does not manifest from frustration.  
The third theory is the Social Learning Theory which describes violence as being learned 
through participation or direct observation and that the consequences are marginalized by the 
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aggressor making violence acceptable to the learner.  The fourth theory is the Cognitive Theory 
which explains that an aggressor perceives reality different from the rest of society which may 
limit or make acceptable the reason for their actions or the consequences there of.  The last 
theory is not truly a theory and has not been explored as much, but contends that psychology is 
not the only reason for violence and that there are most likely biological reasons for violence as 
well.  These might include lack of balance of certain chemicals in the brain, genetic or non-
genetic deformities, traumatic injury or use of drugs, etc…  The truth does not reside in any of 
these theories but most likely a varying combination for each individual.     
Types of Directed Violence 
 There are multiple types of directed violence but the primary types that have been studied 
or seem to hold a large amount of interests in psychology fields for future study include stalking, 
workplace violence and threats against dignitaries or public figures. 
Stalking  
Studies pertaining to stalking is very limited and literature primarily shows that the 
research conducted has to do with erotomanic stalking (where the stalker believes another to be 
in love with the subject), the dangerousness of stalking and potential responses to stalking.  Most 
of the research appears to be on psychological abnormalities and other mental health or social 
issues present and not on the behavior itself.    
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Workplace Violence 
 Unlike stalking, workplace violence has been considerably studied with conclusions 
published to include potential reasons for workplace violence (similar to reasons for all 
violence), risk factors and even prevention programs.  The State of Hawaii developed a working 
group to help develop a guide for Hawaiian businesses to better manage workplace violence 
issues.  In this guide they review the expected warning signs of workplace violence but 
summarize by explaining that “it is important to understand, however, that signs and profiles do 
not predict that violence will occur, rather they merely indicate that there is more of a propensity 
for violence to occur”  (Hawaii, 2001).  However, as many of these types of guides are advising 
businesses and even government agencies to create policies and procedures for managing 
workplace violence, they all refer the issue to local law enforcement. Yet local law enforcement 
may be just as ill prepared to manage the issues surrounding workplace violence as the 
organizations that report it.  Workplace violence often includes violence in hospitals and schools 
as well as other non-office type environments.  In the event that there is a lack of a clear 
terroristic or ideological coercion of fear for political, social or religious gain, then targeted 
violence, as it pertains to the investigations that FPS performs, would fall under a workplace 
violence classification.  Workplace violence is often thought of as violence from coworkers but 
in fact it is any violence that occurs in the workplace and could be from customers as well as 
coworkers. 
Presidential Assassination & Public Figures 
 The majority of research on directed violence towards public figures has been performed 
by or in conjunction with the USSS.  Until the completion of the Exceptional Case Study Project 
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most research was conducted based on retrospective analysis of case studies where not all the 
information was available.  Studies into the causes for this type of violence have speculated that 
it comes from persons with issues of  underlying inadequacies, pathological attachments, self-
loathing, frustration or rage against women, strong sexual desires for their mother and broken 
homes that do not include a father figure (Coggins, 1998).  Dr. Coggins, Dr. Pynchon and Dr. 
Dvoskin point out that most of this research has been speculative at best and is not based on 
empirical research (Coggins, 1998).  They point out that some research has been noteworthy, to 
include “White House cases” which is where individuals that requested an audience with the 
President for various reasons were detained and evaluated by a USSS psychiatrist.  There were 
several findings to include most individuals being white males, in their early 40s and single.  
This research would later help to define the need for understanding the relationship between 
associating with the President and various mental health disorders.  The USSS in the Exception 
Case Study Program would then learn that individual physical, social and even emotional 
characteristics are not as important as the logical process behind the thinking and the behaviors 
that process is enforcing (Coggins, 1998).     
Complex Interaction of Risk Factors (Mental, Physical & Social Health) 
 The use of Risk Factors (RF), to determine the likelihood of susceptibility to a disease, 
originated in epidemiology or the study of human disease and how it progresses through society.  
Epidemiologists use the RF to define the vulnerability an individual person has within a larger 
group of society.  According to the CDC “In the United States, about 90% of lung cancer deaths 
in men and almost 80% of lung cancer deaths in women are due to smoking” (CDC, 2011), thus 
a RF for lung cancer is a history of smoking.  RF has been used beyond epidemiology to analyze 
children and young adolescents‟ potential violence at school in order to provide intervention 
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programs or increased monitoring of students who pose a risk of being violent.  Law 
enforcement sub-organizations such as the FBI‟s BAU and the USSS‟s National Threat 
Assessment Center use RF in order to analyze violence towards victims or individuals they are 
assigned to protect.  RF changes for every person in every situation and does not prove possible 
violence but may help to predict future problems and assist investigators in documenting items of 
concern that may directly or indirectly attributed to a violent act.  Analyzing and researching RF 
gives law enforcement the ability to proactively identify individuals that may be violent in the 
future and provide the threat maker help as available.  RF would not be probable cause to arrest 
an individual and would require a court order or consent for additional assessment or treatment 
of underlying reasons for display of the RF.  In many states there are processes for doctors to 
assess the threat of individuals and order medical holds for psychological evaluation if specific 
criteria are met.  This threshold may or may not be value to behavior based threat assessments 
depending on the state program and the mutual understanding of its use by medical staff and law 
enforcement. 
 There are several categories of RF which include emotional factors, social factors, 
cognitive factors and biological factors.  For example if the threat received was from an 
individual in a gang culture, there might be more emphasis on the biological and social factors.  
In comparison a threat received from an anti-government extremist would most likely measure 
higher in the cognitive and emotional factors.  As if psychology was not complicated enough, the 
analysis must also include individual versus group dynamics and whether the individual or 
groups belief changed or stayed the same in several areas.  The application of psychology in 
criminology also requires a variety of expertise to ensure accuracy and effectiveness. 
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Violence in the Government 
There are countless case studies of specific violent crimes but there are very limited 
numbers of studies that analyze the patterns or suggest possible solutions to violence.  However, 
there has been a rise in public attention to violence in the work place and more materials 
available to help senior manager‟s mange violence in their workplace.  There is obviously a 
terrorist threat to the federal government, a threat of violence from the mentally ill and lastly a 
threat from individuals that are mad at the government. However the workplace violence 
classification has been more comprehensively studied and happens much more frequently.  In 
Dealing with Workplace Violence: a Guide for Agency Planners the Office of Personnel 
Management help agency senior leaders and middle management understand what planning is 
needed to help identify, mitigate and respond to various types of workplace violence.     
Dealing with Workplace Violence starts by explaining how an organization can plan for 
having problems with workplace violence.  These strategies include creating policies, working 
groups, training and pre-employment screening.  To demonstrate the appropriate response at the 
Federal level, OPM worked with various law enforcement to conduct 16 case studies based on 
real life situations.  Even though these case studies do not provide much insight into the cases 
themselves, they do provide a broad overall picture of violence at Federal work places.  The case 
studies include: shooting, viciously wounding of a coworker, suicide attempt, stalking, domestic 
violence, direct threats, veiled threats, threats made during counseling, threats made by ex-
employees, threats made from non-employees, intimidation, disruptive behavior and frightening 
behavior.  It is interesting to note that OPM wrote this document in conjunction with FPS and 
that over half of the case studies involve threats or intimidation (indirect threats).  Even though 
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FPS staff was involved in the writing of the document, FPS is not mentioned as a resource for 
managing these events and actually suggests leadership contact local law enforcement.   
Legal Concerns Of Investigating Threats 
 Most investigations focus on the possession of evidence as the key for a government‟s 
case against a suspect.  Drugs, money, items of value and even trace evidence are used to prove 
that an individual committed a crime.  In threat cases this is often hard to prove unless the 
individual acts out on the threat (and commits a separate crime), or unless the threat is recorded 
on some type of media for the courts to hear and / or see the threat themselves.  18 USC § 111 is 
a classic example of how particular the law is regarding threats and how that hinders law 
enforcements ability to protect the citizens.   18 USC § 111 states “Whoever… forcibly assaults, 
resists, oppose, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with (certain government employees) while 
engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties…”  (Cornell, 2011).  To prove 
that an individual “intimidates” or threatens a certain government employee means that the 
investigator has to be able to interpret and document both the intentions of the suspect and the 
reaction of the victim.  Unless there is a confession this process often results in the investigator 
dropping the case or needing to look for  other evidence (i.e.: the suspect had a gun on him / her 
at the time) before a prosecutor will even look at the case.  How can we expect investigators to 
enforce the law without a legally accepted psychological basis for evaluating the suspect‟s intent 
or the victim‟s reaction? 
 Behavior based threat assessments do create some legal issues themselves.  Behavior 
based threat assessments combine both intelligence operations with criminal investigations.  FPS 
has an obvious need for both and recent legal findings have shown that FPS is within its 
authority to conduct intelligence operations concerning their mission separate from criminal 
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investigations (from the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties investigation in 2009).  
Executive Order (EO) 12333 of 04 December 1981 provides that the Attorney General is 
primarily responsible for the collection of intelligence information within the United States and 
against United States citizens under only specific circumstances.  Various other laws such as the 
Patriot Act and the USA Patriot Improvement And Reauthorization Act of 2005 have restricted or 
enhanced certain types of intelligence operations but the laws concerning the separation between 
US citizens and non citizens stems from EO 12333.  The Attorney General under specific 
direction allows the FBI to coordinate the collection of intelligence information against US 
citizens and all federal law enforcement authorities are required to coordinate such activities with 
the FBI.  Generally this means is that if a crime has occurred, such as an individual made a 
threat, then FPS has the authority on its own to conduct a criminal investigation into the 
accusation.  If no crime has been committed, and there is a general threat of violence against FPS 
protectees, then FPS can continue to investigate to determine whether  another crime has been 
committed or must coordinate with the FBI to conduct an intelligence operation to understand 
the potential threat if no crime is or has occurred. 
 Lastly, because many behavior based threat assessments involve mental health 
professionals, there are generally concerns regarding the access to information and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  This was addressed specifically by the 
USSS as part of the development of their behavior based threat assessment processes and would 
have to be addressed at some point by FPS.  USSS has determined that timely access to such 
information was based more on relationships and  mutual understanding of the use of the 
information then on legal authority.   
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Threat Assessments 
 Article after article concerning directed or targeted violence explains that traditional 
policing strategy and capabilities are ill equipped to manage violence that has not yet happened.  
There is occasionally a public outcry against local police organizations because they failed to 
stop a specific violent crime usually involving a child.  There may be a task force created or a 
crackdown in similar crimes for a period of time, but the fact remains that law enforcement is 
designed to respond reactively and not proactively to crimes, even violent crimes.  There is little 
training available and little to no assistance from the courts in management of a crime that has 
not yet happened.  Most agencies arrest the individual for a more petty crime, such as disorderly 
conduct, warn the individual from any further action, place restraining orders or if serious 
enough place the potential victim, not the offender, in protective custody or victim / witness 
protection programs.  Dr. Fein summarizes the difference in Threat Assessment: An Approach To 
Prevent Targeted Violence, published in the National Institute of Justice, as: 
The primary responsibility of law enforcement professionals is to determine whether a 
crime has been committed, conduct an investigation to identify and apprehend the 
perpetrator, and gather evidence to assist prosecutors in a criminal trial. However, when 
police officers are presented with information and concern about a possible future violent 
crime, their responsibilities, authority, and investigative tools and approaches are less 
clear. (Fein, pg. 2, 1995) 
The ability to perform a timely, accurate and pertinent assessment of the potential risk is 
extremely important to both the agency and the victim.  The hope is not to postpone the attack 
but to remove the suspect ,not the victim, from the critical path they are on, thus removing the 
need for the reactive response to the violence. 
 Most law enforcement organization seems to not understand the difference between 
making threats and posing a threat.  The classic example of domestic violence demonstrates the 
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regular inability for law enforcement to manage future violence.  Most local officers are required 
by policy arrest one of the individuals, arrest the male, or use his / her discretion as to whether or 
not the individuals can stay together.  This decision is made within minutes and with little to no 
background information other than the officer‟s personal experience, education and any 
information in the local criminal databases.  Immediately before the officer‟s arrival both parties 
could have been screaming death threats at each other, but now that the officer is there they both 
say they are fine and just needed to settle down.  In some case this is true but in others the officer 
leaves and comes back to more disturbances or much worse crimes.  The only way for officers to 
make informed decisions about the risk posed is by understanding the threat assessment process 
and understanding that not all threats are carried out, and not all violence was predicated by a 
threat.  The Exceptional Case Study Project conducted by the US Secret Service showed that out 
of 83 incidents the suspect(s) either carried out an assassination attempt or planned to assassinate 
a public figure, only 4% had ever communicated a direct threat to the target.  However, 63% had 
a “history of indirect, conditional, or direct threat about target” directed to somebody other than 
the target (USSS, pg 7, 1999).   
 The Exceptional Case Study Project suggests a use of Critical Path to Violence (CPV) for 
better understanding how close a suspect is to committing to an act of violence.  In The Path To 
Terrorist Violence: A Threat Assessment Model For Radical Groups At Risk Of Escalation To 
Acts Of Terrorism Mr. Dean Olson, in his thesis published by the Naval Post Graduate School‟s 
Center for Homeland Security, explores the use of CPV in assessing potential violence from 
radical groups.  Mr. Olson explains that CPV is simply using behavior to assess the 
psychological path that an individual moves along towards an act of violence.  According to 
Olson most if not every person that commits pre planned acts of violence must go through this 
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critical path to find their actions acceptable and just (Olson, 2005, 7).  Olson cited research by 
James W. Clarke in 1981 who studied the psychopathology of the perpetrator‟s thoughts instead 
of the relationship between their actions and mental illness.   Clarke was the first to understand 
the “situational approach to predicting political dangerousness‟ by noting behaviors and actions 
common to assassins” (Olson, 2005, 7).  By identifying the behaviors critical to an assassins 
actions Clark and then Olson were able to predict by future physical behaviors and previous 
psychological states required to get to the behaviors shown.  Clark‟s research allowed for the 
USSS to identify assassins based upon their behavior (which is much more readably observable 
and reliable) and then the psychology of a plan of attack.  Olson was able to adopt the CPV 
theory developed by Calhoun into a 
graphic representation of the 5 phases 
needed as part of the path to violence 
and their relationship to both criminal 
activity and risk of attack.  The phases 
of psychological development that 
result in specific behavioral outputs 
include Grievance, Ideation, Research & Planning, Preparation, Breach and lastly Attack.  For 
purposes of this research and its application within FPS we will focus on Grievance through 
Preparation.  However, this does not preclude investigating the prior levels by agents or officers 
who identify an attack based on other training.   
 Olson describes in detail the relationship between each phase and its relationship to 
radical groups and points out that the time it takes to travel between phases or along the entire 
path is irrelevant and could be hours or years (Olson, 2005, 13).  ((In this application there has 
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not been much study of the application of each phase against a generic application of the federal 
government. this makes no sense to me)).  However a combination of research from the USSS, 
US Capital Police, US Marshals Service and researchers such as Olson provide a very strong 
overall picture of the anticipated behaviors as the research conducted in all of these organizations 
is to protect a more specific section of the federal government.   
Grievance 
 Having a clear, understandable grievance according to Crenshaw is the first step in 
developing the psychology needed to attack the federal government.  Humans do not in general 
perform violent acts without a reason.  Generally these reasons are psychologically 
understandable even if the majority of society would not act the same based on a similar 
grievance.  Having a thorough understanding of the grievance and how important the grievance 
is to the individual or group will help investigators to understand the willingness to act out 
violence (Olson 2005, 24). 
Ideation 
Ideation is the point where the individual or group starts to rationalize separately from 
other more socially acceptable ways of managing grief.  At this point the individual or group 
starts to distance themselves morally.  The theory of Crisis of Legitimacy helps identify the 
change from Grievance to Ideation and explains the reasons that individuals use language that 
depersonalizes their enemy as part of their threatening behavior.  This helps to further plans by 
weighting more heavily the values of the individual or group over, in this case, the government.  
In order to do this an individual or group must reject the legitimacy of the government over 
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themselves and will make statements to that affect (Sprinzak, 1991, 50).  This is further 
supported by research that showed that group rhetoric concerning a higher morality was a 
significant indicator of potential violence (Smith, 2004, 418).  Often times this ideation is 
described in written threats, journals or on web sites and blogs.  Because of the degree of 
separation between societal norms and the ideation there is often another person or group that is 
supporting the ideation.  Individual with a clear grievance who also identify themselves with 
these types of organizations would be of extreme concern to FPS.  However, it is not illegal to be 
aggrieved, to associate yourself with such organizations or speak out against the government.  
Since higher risk agencies, such as Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, 
Environmental Protection Agency, etc…, report many of the threats to FPS, it is also important 
to realize that those agencies also had a relationship with the individual or group prior to the 
grievance.  Changes in behavior around the time of the grievance can be strong indicators of the 
transition to Ideation.  The next phase, Research & Planning, is not only where illegal activity 
begins but also where the individual or groups actions become much more observable. 
Research & Planning 
 After an individual has embraced violence as an acceptable and possible answer to their 
grievance, then the individual may begin to plan out how they would perform their attack.  
Planning can vary in length of time but requires certain predicable behaviors.  This is the first 
point where a suspect‟s intentions maybe detected because the research the aggrieved must 
conduct prior to an attack that forces the individual to come into in-direct and direct contact with 
the target, .  Behaviors would include, at a minimum, requests for information, observation of 
target, search of public records, stalking type behavior and / or questioning of individuals that 
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know the target.  The records of this type of research may be kept in journals, safes, private areas 
or published on websites or very public venues.  Olson uses a quote from the website of the 
Animal Liberation Front to demonstrate the Research & Planning phase: 
You can install all of the motion sensor lights in the world and it won't make a difference. 
You've been marked. …We've been in your house while in San Francisco. We've 
'bumped' into you at Costco. You've given us the time while in line at Bank of America. 
We've been watching you and your family. (Olson 2005, 31) 
 Interviews of individuals associated with the target may have also noticed suspicious activity 
which could be indicators of research.  It is also important to note that in the provided example 
the locations where information was collected where only partially at the workplace and were 
primarily collected at a place of residence and in the community. This is important for FPS as 
there has been a long standing confusion of where the authority of certain law enforcement 
officer resides and what the nexus to the federal government is.  In the above example, if the 
researcher was a federal employee and the attack planned for federal property, then the suspect‟s 
collection of information at the bank and Costco has a clear nexus to the threat against federal 
property. 
 The evolution of the individual‟s progress along the CPV is important at this point 
because of several reasons.  First this shows the psychological progress the individual has made 
towards an attack and that they are now willing to risk being caught while trying to carry out 
their plans.  Secondly, the use of criminal activity to meet their goal means that law enforcement 
can legally start to collect criminal investigative information and maintain information against 
the individual or group.  Prior to this point civil rights protection, as explained in the Legal 
Concerns of Investigating Threats section of this document, limit information gathering against 
individuals and groups from law enforcement intelligence operations.  However, if criminal 
activity is suspected as part of a potential attack, then FPS has the full legal authority to 
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investigate those crimes and their relationship to the future attack.  Ideally, since the government 
is the one seen as being at fault to the aggrieved, as in most FPS cases, then it seems that the 
agencies involved would want to mitigate the threat of violence as soon as possible.  However, 
there is blurring between the Grievance and Ideation that leads to violence which could make a 
mitigation strategy difficult to enforce between agencies.  The ability to determine the 
seriousness of the potential attack does not appear until the Research & Planning phase has 
started.   
Preparation  
 Preparation generally goes beyond just obtaining or building a weapon and may include 
practice runs, final act behaviors, and other outwardly less meaningful criminal activity.  As an 
example in the Springfield, IL federal courthouse potential attack thwarted by the FBI the 
suspect was stopped by local law enforcement for speeding within minutes of the dry run as he 
was “fleeing the city”.  The suspect‟s vehicle was impounded due to an expired driver‟s license 
and an FBI confidential informant had to pick up the suspect to drive him home.  Final act 
behaviors may include grooming or costuming, putting affairs in order or documenting final 
thoughts and reasons for violence.  Many of these behaviors are also of a more public nature that 
is possibly detectable by law enforcement.    At this point the risk of violence is extreme and the 
danger to the public is significant.   
Breach 
 The Breach is often seen as the beginning of the attack and is where the suspect puts 
themselves or their weapon within proximity to the target.  The Transportation Security 
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Administration uses sophisticated screening equipment and the Behavior Detection Officer 
program to screen passenger flights for potential attackers that are at the Breach phase of the 
CPV.  The only way to detect the behavior at this point is to identify individuals that are 
exhibiting behaviors associated with extreme amounts of stress or detecting the weapon.  
Multiple studies have been conducted on this type of behavior and FPS is working on several 
strategies to improve detection efforts at the security screening check points that would work in 
conjunction with CPV and be mutually supportive.   
Chapter Summary 
 After decades of research trying to connect violence with mental illness, social / family 
issues or biological deformities the prevailing theory is that violence is much more complicated 
than previously thought.  The true reason for violence is a combination of many factors and 
because of the number of variables and the information needed to understand each variable, law 
enforcement may never be able to use the “reason for violence” to predict future violence.  In the 
absence of this type of research has shown that it is more helpful to utilize the Critical Path to 
Violence (CPV) model in determining whether an individual is moving towards violence.  This 
analysis of behaviors allows for law enforcement to understand the psychology of the suspect 
and their relationship with the victims without a full psychological analysis.  CPV has shown to 
have substantial application within federal law enforcement including the US Secret Service, US 
Capital Police and US Marshals Service.  As any new program there are always concerns for the 
Federal Protective Service‟s (FPS) implementation of a CPV program but the precedence has 
been set, at this point primary need is in the use of applied research to create a CPV that is 
specific to FPS‟s protective mission.  With this ability FPS will better be able to mitigate threats 
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and provide a more detailed account of the facts to assist the US Attorneys in prosecuting cases 
where a suspect has threatened the US Government.  
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Chapter 3 
METHOD 
 
The research was conducted in conjunction with the Federal Protective Service / 
Department of Homeland Security out of Denver, Colorado.  The literature review identified 
several similar research projects conducted by private, scholarly organizations in conjunction 
with the US Secret Service (USSS).  Their model was to develop research questions, question 
pertaining to psychology, behavior and the investigative process used to investigate the crimes 
and then analyze the research results and use those results to identify opportunities for growth 
within the USSS.  Due to the lack of resources and the inability to access entire case files this 
method had to be modified to include only publically available information.   
The research questions that have been identified for this project include: How do 
attackers develop the idea of targeting the federal government?  What motivates people to act 
violently towards the federal government?  How are targets selected?  What types of violence are 
used to attack the federal government?  What relationship is there between threats and violence 
in regards to FPS protectees?  What relationship exists between mental illness and violence in 
regards to FPS protectees? What is the critical path to violence for attacks against the federal 
government?  How can the critical path to violence be disrupted to prevent or mitigate potential 
attacks? 
 The research questions were used to evaluate the relevance of each of the case studies 
used to ensure that the case studies examined provide substantial evidence either in supportive of 
or against a psychological progression that can be demonstrated through the use of a behavioral 
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analysis program.  These case files include information derived from both public and non public 
sources to include the media, court filling, law enforcement bulletins, reports and case studies.  
Based on the similarities of intent and the anticipated critical path being similar to what was 
created by the Exceptional Case Study Project by the USSS similar variables were used.   
 The information was collected, organized and analyzed in conjunction with a Regional 
Intelligence Agent from the Federal Protective Service to ensure that information is being 
analyzed with the goal of protecting life and federal property.  This Special Agent has several 
years of experience working as a federal law enforcement officer responsible for investigating 
threats against federal property, has extensive experience in working with various other law 
enforcement organizations in the protection of threatened property or persons and has been 
educated on the scholarly research procedures and application.   
 10 cases that clearly were the responsibility of the FPS, were analyzed.  All cases had 
been investigated in the last 20 years, were directed against the United States federal government 
and either had resulted in an attack on the intended target or plans to attack the target.  If the 
target was not attacked the plans to attack must have been refined to the point where the attack 
was imminent but interrupted by law enforcement.  Each case is summarized in the Case Study 
section of the Results chapter of this document.  Analysis of the results was conducted and this 
information was used to create various training aids and a professional recommendation for 
changes to the Protective Investigation Program (PIP). 
Chapter Summary 
 As the research has shown by the US Secret Service (USSS) the application of the use of 
a Critical Path to Violence (CPV) methodology to measure behavior could provide the Federal 
Protective Service a well defined tool which helps investigators to analyze a specific threat.  The 
need for scholarly, peer reviewed research as part of this process (within the USSS‟s research) 
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has created an opportunity for large amounts of information to be made publically available and 
useful in determining the specifics to the CPV.  Use of research questions to define variables of 
interests and then evaluation of those interests by the development of cases studies was well 
received by both criminologists and psychologists. A basic analysis of the results and the 
development of training aids were instrumental in helping the USSS to develop organizational 
changes that assisted them in meeting their goals and effectively carry out their mission.  Similar 
research methods and application strategies will help to solve the problem FPS faces in 
mitigating the threats of directed violence.   
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Chapter 4 
RESULTS 
Research Questions 
How do attackers develop the idea of targeting the federal government?  What motivates 
people to act violently towards the federal government?  How are targets selected?  What types 
of violence is used to attack the federal government?  What relationship is there between threats 
and violence in regards to FPS protectees?  What relationship exists between mental illness and 
violence in regards to FPS protectees? What is the critical path to violence for attacks against the 
federal government?  How can the critical path to violence be disrupted to prevent or mitigate 
potential attacks?  These research questions were used to define the applicability of the below 
case studies to the FPS investigative process and the potential use of behavioral analysis. 
 
Case Studies 
 Cases studies are helpful in analyzing the particulars of an incident or a series of incident 
without having to document all of the facts of the case.  These case studies are designed to 
research the relationship between the attacker and their individual Critical Path to Violence 
(CPV).  Each case study starts with an introduction then discusses the relationship of known 
information regarding behaviors associated with the CPV and lastly any other impact the 
investigation had the behavioral analysis research.  Information from these cases studies was 
only obtained from publically available information and other information may be available from 
the various law enforcement organizations that better document the relationship to CPV and the 
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attacks.  Only cases where a “successful” attack occurred was used to demonstrate the result of 
violence. 
Timothy McVeigh 
 The case study of Timothy McVeigh is of extreme importance to the federal government 
because of the implications of the attack.  The Oklahoma City Bombing prompted an evolution 
in the methodology used to secure federal property.  However, all of the changes involved the 
assessment process and countermeasure use in the mitigation of specific threats.  For example 
most federal buildings and courthouses now are built with a standoff distance of at least 50 feet 
between a vehicle barrier and the exterior of the building.  This ensures that a blast from a 
vehicle born improvised explosive device dissipates enough force prior to the blast hitting the 
building and that the blast does not cause structural collapse, unlike what happen at the Alfred P 
Murrah building.   
There is a good amount of public information available and many cases studies have been 
done to examine the psychology behind McVeigh‟s attacks.  McVeigh had a clear fascination 
with weapons and special force tactics.  While in the military McVeigh tried to join Special 
Forces but his psychological evaluation showed McVeigh would not be well suited for the job 
(Dugan, 2006; PBS, 1995).    McVeigh had a generic grievance against the government to 
include issues with taxes and gun rights until the incidents at Ruby Ridge and then in Waco, TX 
with the Branch Davidians.  These two incidents McVeigh saw as direct assaults by federal 
agents on the Constitutional rights of citizens and that the violation of their rights resulted in the 
death of innocent bystanders.  McVeigh moved around extensively (nearly transient) and did not 
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associate with much other than the gun shows and gun rights activists.  Several old military 
buddies moved in and out of his life including Terry Nichols.  Nichols possibly had 
communications with Ramsey Yousef which provided further ideation.  It is unclear how much 
time McVeigh spent planning his attack but it is known that he purchased components for the 
bomb over several months from multiple states.  There was no need to breach the secure area and 
the attack happened as McVeigh had planned.  During the court proceedings McVeigh explained 
that the death of the 19 children in the building was considered collateral damage and that if he 
had known about the children he might have picked a different method of attack.   
 Andrew Stack 
 In February of 2010 Andrew Stack was extremely upset with the IRS after years of 
battles over unpaid taxes.  Stack wrote a manifesto detailing his feelings and explaining the 
reason for his follow on actions.  Stack then lit a fire at his home and then flew a small plane into 
the IRS office in Austin, TX.  As this case is substantially newer than the Oklahoma City 
Bombing there is not as much public information available, accept the manifesto written by 
Stack prior to his death.   
 When reading through the manifesto Stack clearly had a specific grievance which he had 
tried to resolve multiple times over several years.  Stack had several communications with 
several family and friends about his frustration with the IRS leading up to the attack.  Even 
though there was not a clear individual or group that supported his ideation prior to the attack, 
there was an obvious attempt to seek indirect approval for his potential violence.  Several reports 
after the attack cited Stack‟s daughter calling Stack a hero for his antigovernment motivations.  
Most of Stack‟s preparation was related to his writing of the manifesto.  According to Business 
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Insider Stack made 27 changes to his manifesto over 2 days.  Stack finished his manifesto at 
11:42 pm the day prior to the attack (Business, 2010).  There was no public information 
regarding Stack‟s choice of using an aircraft other than he was a pilot and had access to the 
aircraft.  The breach and attack happened at the same time. Two people were killed and 13 
injured.  
 Johnny Wicks 
 In January of 2009 Johnny Wicks became so mad at the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) that he set his Las Vegas home on fire and then went to the Federal Courthouse where the 
SSA office was and shot and killed a Court Security Officer.  After firing multiple shots into the 
building Wicks fled the area but was chased across the street by deputies from the US Marshals 
Service where he was shot and killed. 
 According to ABC News who interviewed the family of Wicks he was upset with the 
SSA due to his disability payments being reduced and a law suit against the SSA being dismissed 
(ABC, 2009).  As part of that law suit Wicks had claimed that he was racially discriminated 
against by the SSA.  Wicks clearly had a grievance which he had attempted to fix through legal 
actions (Wicks Lawsuit).  Wicks had an extensive criminal history which may have decreased 
the need for an ideation period.  No public information has been available to determine any other 
factors regarding Ideations or the Research and Planning phases.  Setting his house on fire is a 
classic “last act” behavior generally associated with the Preparation Phase.  Wicks waited outside 
of the courthouse for a short period and then entered the courthouse as the courthouse opened.  
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Wicks did not make it past the security but did breach the envelope of the building before 
retreating to the streets where he was shot and killed.  
 Abdulhakim Muhammad 
 The case of Abdulhakim Muhammad is of extreme interest to this research as he is the 
attacker that affiliated himself with an international terrorist organization.  Muhammad was born 
and raised in the United States but renounced his family, changed his name and moved to 
Yemen.  While in Yemen he was detained by the Yemen authorities on charges of supporting 
terrorism, was interviewed by American authorities and then deported back to the United States.  
Within several months of being back Muhammad attacked the US Military recruiter‟s office in 
Little Rock, AR.  After being arrested Muhammad wrote the judge asking for the death penalty, 
stating that he was of a sound mind and believed his actions justified according to Islamic law. 
 Muhammad‟s conversion to Islam happened in college and previous to that he had a case 
that was dropped for both weapons and drug charges.  As part of his conversation to an extremist 
Islam Muhammad started attending a mosque that was frequented by other known terrorists.   In 
2007 Muhammad traveled to Yemen where he studied Arabic and married a Muslim woman.  
While in Yemen he reportedly studied at the Damaj Institute which is the same school John 
Walker Lindh (shoe bomber) studied while overseas.  Clearly due to Muhammad‟s associations 
there was a clear tendency to violence based on the ideation of the group.  Even though 
Muhammad told investigators after the fact that he did not plan the attack but he did attempt to 
buy the weapons in the hopes to be able to conduct an attack.  After being successfully 
Muhammad reportedly studied several potential targets including three separate recruiter 
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stations.  As Muhammad drove by the Little Rock, AR recruiter‟s office he saw two soldiers 
outside smoking.  He pulled up to the soldiers and started shooting (NEFA, 2009).  Even thou 
there was not a clear plan for a specific target there was a clear planning and preparation phase 
for an unknown attack.  Having the rifle and not needing to breach the security perimeter was the 
crime of opportunity which was facilitated by the behaviors associated with the CPV. 
 Also of interest to this research is the interaction between Muhammad and the FBI.  Due 
to the nature of his deportation back to the US the FBI had several interactions with Muhammad 
overseas and in the US attempting to determine his affiliation with terrorists.  The FBI was not 
able to obtain the information they needed to obtain a wire tap or put Muhammad under 
surveillance.  However, had they used a behavioral analysis program they may have been able to 
show the courts that the behaviors indicate likelihood to commit an act of violence. The 
information obtained by the FBI was never publically released, however it is unlikely that a 
behavior analysis was completed which may have provided the information needed for more 
significant monitoring (NEFA, 2009).     
 Michael C. Finton 
 The case of Michael Finton was also extremely important to this research as it was 
extremely well documented by the FBI as they were able to introduce a confidential informant 
(CI) early into the investigations.  Finton was introduced by a friend to a CI who was posed as an 
Al Qaeda operative recruiting terrorists from the US.  Through the progression of several 
meetings Finton proposed a plan to the CI and an undercover FBI agent to blow up the 
Springfield, IL Federal Courthouse.  The FBI and ATF provided a vehicle with a fake bomb and 
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Finton drove the bomb to the building and attempted to detonate it.  Even though the attack was 
not real Finton was unaware of this making his demonstrated behavior from the begging through 
to the attack extremely valuable to the federal government. 
 According to the review that the Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation (NEFA) 
conducted using various court documents and news reports.  Finton was arrested for armed 
assault and robbery in 1999 and was converted to Islam in prison.  Finton was described by a 
local paper as being extremely anti-American due to the letters to the editor that Finton would 
submit which focused on Islam and the oppression of the Muslims.  Finton traveled to Saudi 
Arabia but it is unclear if this trip was to further radicalize Finton.  After being introduced to the 
CI Finton made statements expressing his wish to fight jihad and that he would rather die as a 
martyr then live in the US.  Finton requested to seek training and then was introduced to the 
undercover agent.  As Finton‟s frustration grew with not being trained Finton suggest that he 
could attack a target in the United States.  Clearly Finton had a grievance and believed in his 
specific ideation against the United States.  Finton believed he needed the appropriate training, 
equipment and knowledge to be able to commit the attack. Finton‟s willingness to attack the 
federal courthouse was based on the symbolism of the courthouse and the proximity to several 
political leader‟s offices across the street.  After several months of meetings and a dry run the 
FBI provided Finton the fake bomb. There was no breach necessary, however the vehicle was 
parked in a no parking zone.  After retreating several blocks Finton attempted to remote detonate 
the bomb twice prior to being arrested.   
 Finton‟s recorded conversations which are transcribed in the court documents clearly 
show all phases of the CPV and the need for them to be displayed in the specific order. 
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 Matthew Fraticelli 
 The arrest and conviction of Matthew Fraticelli is likely the most interesting and unique 
of the cases examined in that Fraticelli did not have an explainable grievance.  According to 
court documents  Fraticelli plead guilty to creating an unregistered explosive device.  Fraticelli 
explained that he had made a bomb out of a mini keg and placed it at the federal courthouse 
without lighting the fuse. Fraticelli denied targeting any specific person or the courthouse in 
general.  Even though there was no known Grievance phase there is evidence of the other phases.  
As Fraticelli had a previous conviction for the same charge directed at a non federal entity it is 
logical that at some point there was a period of ideation where Fraticelli came to the 
understanding that building explosives was morally acceptable.  There was a clear phase of 
Research & Planning as Fraticelli admitted to scouting out a location the month prior and also 
need time and materials to build the bomb.  The Breach phase was not necessary as the bomb 
was placed outside of the secure area but would have caused damage within the secure area if it 
had gone off.  Fraticelli did not light the fuse and thus the attack never occurred.  The lack of 
actual violence may demonstrate that even though Fraticelli believes it ok to build bombs that he 
has not psychologically committed himself to needing violence to alleviate a grievance.  This 
would further explain the lack of grievance and unclear period of ideation and so would not be 
considered an act of directed violence.  The Fraticelli case further supports that behavioral 
analysis and the Critical Path to Violence can be used to assess dangerousness as Fraticelli did 
not act out the violence because of a lack of grievance.  Lastly, if you consider the Fraticelli case 
as violent based on the potential of violence it would be of random violence which has a 
completely separate psychological basis then targeted or directed violence, which is the study of 
this project.         
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Research Limitations 
There were several research problems that for future research must be addressed as part 
of the research design.  The first is for this project the definition of cases that were analyzed 
versus not being analyzed was not all encompassing.  The USSS was able to include any case 
that they defined as posing a credible threat to the protectee because the individual either was 
going to or attempted to conduct the attack.  Since FPS has such a large number of cases where 
the dangerousness is questionable there was no possible way, with the resources available, to 
provide for a comprehensive analysis.  Furthermore, since much of the background questions for 
CPV are not currently being asked, unless the case went to court or received a large amount of 
media exposure there was no way for the researcher to identify the appropriate response to the 
majority of the variables.  This could be resolved by adopting the CPV model and addressing the 
questions for each phase so that future researchers would have this information available to 
them.   
Additional research limitations include the lack of control groups (as law enforcement 
cannot let the violence happen if they know about it), the sheer quantity of variables and the use 
of indirect sources.  The use of indirect sources is the only research limitation that could be 
removed by having the researcher also performs the functions of the investigating agent as the 
USSS did.  The researcher not being an agent limited the amount of information that was 
available. 
Additional Research Ideas 
In researching the application of CPV within FPS there were several other research topics 
that were identified that could of great value to FPS.  These included:  Partnership with AUSA 
and Mental Health Professionals to better understand each other‟s roles in mitigating threats, 
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functions of Behavior Based Threat Assessment in organizational or societal sub groups, 
development of a FPS specific CPV assessment of suspects of directed violence, study factors 
influencing agents‟ judgment in evaluating risk of directed violence, and lastly study the legal, 
social and cultural factors that affect risk mitigation strategies within FPS. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 There are multiple examples of how a behavioral analysis program would allow FPS to 
make a more informed decision about the progression of an individual to an act of violence and 
assist investigators in determining the most appropriate mitigation strategies.  Use of case studies 
can be used as an appropriate method for determining the applicability of a behavioral analysis 
program and to measure the effectiveness of these programs after implemented.  Use of a 
behavioral analysis program does require senior leadership to address some problems to include 
the access of information for researchers, the introduction and use of the behavioral analysis as a 
uniform tool for investigation of all cases involving directed violence and additional research 
into the variables that would be determined to be most valuable for both research and 
investigation.  
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Chapter 5 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The combination of the above research with the cases studies provides a clear need for a 
behavioral analysis program within the FPS and demonstrates the applicability of these types of 
programs in other law enforcement organizations which have a protective mission. 
FPS Critical Path to Violence 
 One of the primary goals of the research was to understand whether there is a relationship 
between the US Secret Service‟s behavior based threat assessment models and directed violence 
against FPS protected properties.  There is a clear and direct correlation between the Critical Path 
to Violence (CPV) theories and the behaviors displayed prior to attack in the case studies of FPS 
protected properties.  With a clearly discernable Grievance, Ideation, Research & Planning, 
Breach & Attack phases in most incidents.  There were no other potential phases identified.  
There was a strong increase in dangerousness, risk and criminal activity as each phase of the 
CPV was reached. 
Time Frame Of Progression Down CPV 
 There does not appear to be any regular pattern associated with the CPV and the amount 
of time it takes an individual(s) to progress through the CPV.  There are too many psychological 
variables to be able to predict how close to violence an individual is; however there does seem to 
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be some acceleration from the Research & Planning Phase to the Attack Phase in comparison to 
the time it takes to go from the Grievance Phase to the Research & Planning Phase.  It seems to 
be logical that if the grievance continues to happen or is perceived to be repeated after the 
Ideation Phase then this could provide psychological support to the need for violence, thus 
speeding up the need to act out. 
 Possible Mitigation Strategies 
 Ideally mitigating the threats at the Grievance Phase would provide the strongest 
likelihood and ability to change the psychological conditions that lead to progression down the 
CPV.  Unfortunately detecting the severity of the issues at this point is nearly impossible and 
ultimately not the role of FPS.  Since FPS‟s mission is twofold, one to respond to crime and the 
other to prevent crime, FPS‟s involvement is limited until between the Ideation Phase and the 
Research & Planning Phase.  FPS‟s goal with the use of CPV would not be to prevent the 
grievance but rather to get the suspect back on a more socially accepted cycle of managing the 
grievance or limiting the individual‟s ability to progress down the CPV.  In order to be able to 
detect the evolution from ideation to planning an attack, requires the participation of not only 
FPS but also the protectees themselves.  For this reason the most important role FPS plays in the 
mitigation of directed violence is in the initial assessment.  In order to affectively be able to 
evaluate the risk FPS must develop a relationship with the protectees, have a defined process for 
collecting and evaluation risk related information, and have a plan for acting on that information.  
Specific details currently include or may include: 
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 Developing Relationships – Many protectees do not see the threat as credible and so 
unless told to report specific activities through training and professional relationships 
then the incidents go unreported.  Training must be pertinent to the job the protectee 
performs and in support and cooperation with their leadership.  More advanced training 
must be provided to supervisors with the emphases on asking questions and reporting 
potential incidents.  Training should stress that government employees who work with 
the public are not required to be harassed or assaulted as part of their work and that this 
behavior must be reported.  Training should also encourage employees to pay attention to 
their surroundings and ask questions.  Lastly Inspectors, Agents, Area Commanders and 
even Protective Security Officers should develop strong, professional relationships with 
the protectees to build mutual trust and respect which will facilitate more timely reporting 
of incidents.  In general FPS must practice the Community Policing Methodologies to 
build stronger relationships.  The current FPS provided Security Awareness Training 
provides for many of these functions but is inconsistently provided 
.   
 Initial Evaluation – The USSS did several studies on the variables that affected agent‟s 
ability to evaluate the risk associated with directed violence.  The current PIP program 
and policies provide for a broad response to threats but does not require the investigator 
to collect specific information which validates or disproves the threat.  Generally the 
initial contact with the individual is the only contact and is prefaced by very basic 
information.  These contacts often result in a letter from FPS to the suspect explaining the 
criminal implications of further harassing or threatening actions.  However, there is often 
little to no attempt in understanding the reasons for the behavior or how the behavior 
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identified can be mitigated.  In a simple line of questioning FPS could identify whether 
the behavior that first drew the attention of FPS was a result of the suspect being on the 
CPV.  Without this evaluation there is no ability for FPS to evaluate the need for further 
action until after another crime has happened. 
 
 Plan For Action – Lastly, FPS needs a plan for how to manage suspect that are identified 
to be progressing down the CPV to all levels.  This might include case management, 
criminal proceedings, psychological assessments, facilitating conversations between the 
suspect and the government or routine meetings with the suspect.  Many of these have 
legal challenges and requirements but the precedence that the USSS has set clearly 
provides the ability for FPS to work with suspects in non criminal arenas to mitigate 
threats. 
 Documenting Dangerousness For Court Proceedings 
 If non court related mitigation strategies are not appropriate or do not work then FPS may 
have to file criminal charges against suspects of directed violence.  The CPV process helps FPS 
in documenting these cases as it provide a basis for the reasons behind the directed violence and 
the potential for additional violence if there is no intervention.  Often threat cases become a he 
said / she said in front of the courts.  With a well documented case file which includes the 
reasons for the behavior, the behavior demonstrated, the FPS actions to help the suspect to 
refocus their behavior, and the support information needed to make those decisions provides a 
thorough picture of the situation.  This also provides the courts the ability to provide other 
interventions as part of a sentence to include mandatory psychological treatment, restraining 
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orders and for supervised release after incarceration.  These all provide FPS added ability to 
track the behavior through the criminal justice process to ensure that the suspect is not becoming 
more dangerous due to the courts actions and just delaying the violence.   
Recommendations 
  Based on the research, the following recommendations are made to the FPS as part of the 
development of a behavioral analysis program. 
Potential Policy Changes 
 The current focus in protecting government employees is in the generic Comprehensive 
Risk Assessment prior to a specific threat maker being known and then the Protective 
Investigations Program (PIP) once a threat maker has been identified.  The policy requires an 
immediate investigation and determination of the risk within set time frames but does not 
provide the guidelines for the evaluation.  The PIP needs to be expanded to include issues that 
make the risk higher or lower and how that information is to be obtained.  To do this the USSS 
developed tools that provide agents uniform, clearly understandable, question / answer type 
documents which allow an agent to follow the defined behavior based assessments from start to 
finish, such as the CPV.  Once a section of the PIP describes the use of behavior based 
assessments then the appropriate actions should also be defined.  These actions should include 
voluntary and non-voluntary psychological counseling, criminal charges, verbal and written 
warnings, undercover surveillance, use of undercover officers and informants.  The remainder of 
the document is thorough and comprehensive. 
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 Additional Training  
 Law enforcement personnel should be provided adequate training on the use of behavior 
based threat assessments to ensure that the risk is being measured accurately and that the 
mitigation techniques are affective.  Both initial training and recurring training should stress the 
importance of using CPV as a tool to identify questions that need answered and as a method for 
documenting the risk for future action.  Behavior based assessments is not all that different from 
what agents already do, but instead of acting on „instinct‟ there needs to be an ability for the 
agent to describe the behavior and the significance of that behavior.  At the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) many of their training program regarding use of force 
require the officers to be able to understand their perception of the circumstances and to be able 
to describe it adequately.   Investigators are encouraged to describe in great detail why they 
would or did use force.  For example, the suspect clenched his teeth / fist, swore at me, 
threatened me, hit other objects, rolled up his sleeves, bladed me, would not remove his hands 
from his pockets, etc…  Agents must understand that CPV is simply a tool that investigators use 
to document the behaviors they are seeing (prior to the violence) and why those are important to 
the totality of the circumstances.  With CPV the actions may not be as clear but are just as 
relevant to the investigators ability to protect the potential victims.   
Creation of a Behavioral Analysis Unit 
 As the US Secret Service developed this model they found that a partnership between 
psychologists, the courts, mental health professionals and law enforcement was greatly beneficial 
to their protective operations.  Out of this partnership developed the National Threat Assessment 
Center which is tasked with assisting in the use and development of behavior based threat 
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assessments.  FPS recognition of these types of partnerships and the critical role that they would 
play in the FPS protective mission would be best demonstrated by developing a Behavioral 
Analysis Unit which would have several functions that would support the use of the CPV.   
Potential goals might include: 
- To provide support to FPS inspectors, agents and leadership responsible for 
investigating threats in the areas of back ground investigation, psychology of threats, 
historical reference and trends regarding threats, other resources available for 
assisting in investigations and providing a national level coordination between FPS 
and other federal law enforcement organizations such as the National Threat 
Assessment Center. 
- Research and analyze intelligence, information sharing channels, trends, case studies, 
potential resources, mitigation strategies, investigation strategies and other support 
information which assist FPS staff in investigating or mitigating threats to the federal 
government. 
- Provide FPS, DHS and other partners with training, resources and expertise in the 
management and investigation of threats. 
The practical uses of this type of program would include: 
- To facilitates a faster response to threats by providing agents, inspectors and 
leadership with a clear picture of the likelihood of the threat materializing and the 
potential consequences based on a comprehensive background investigation (behavior 
based risk assessment) compared to historical indicators and mitigation strategies.    
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- To assist agents & inspectors with documenting threats by analyzing interviews of 
both suspects and victims to create a clear picture of the motives for the threat and the 
intentions for carrying out the threat.  Provide psychological analysis of the state of 
mind of both the threat maker and the victims.  Ensures a comprehensive analysis of 
each threat and case reviews provide feedback for agents & inspectors for 
professional growth. 
- Research conducted by the team ensures that FPS is one of the premier agencies in 
the world regarding investigation of threats.  This expertise would be used by senior 
leadership to make strategic decisions about response to threats, training and 
interaction with other federal law enforcement organizations. 
- The team would provide FPS an unparallel, internal ability to analyze the 
effectiveness of the PIP program, make changes and provide training to FPS staff on 
the most current intelligence and investigative strategies. 
- Provide expert witness consulting services to FPS cases regarding behavior based 
threat assessments, the CPV model, law enforcements interactions with mental health 
professionals and the non court related mitigation strategies.   
 
Building an FPS Behavioral Analysis Unit: 
- These teams often must be funded separately by Congress (such as the National 
Threat Assessment Center).  If this developed into a national program that is widely 
used by the other agency then that might be necessary.  However, on an agency level 
the possibilities could be explored in the same manner as the Secret Service started 
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the NTAC.  The unit could be started by allowing a formal partnership between a 
university, the courts, the FPS intelligence operations and mental health professionals 
as an additional duty for 2 to 5 general crimes agents that are working across the 
country.   
A team with strong partnerships, which strive for a better understanding of the behavior that 
leads to violence, would be a very strong asset that could shape the future of FPS in many ways.  
As FPS is not far from this ability the implementation expenses could be minimal in comparison 
to the current costs of investigating crimes without an ability to measure the effectiveness of the 
program, and the inherit risk that creates. 
Chapter Summary 
 Hopefully the time, energy and resources vested in this project will be used to better 
protect the government, the people that use the government‟s services and even the individuals 
that feel the need to make threats or attack the government.  The CPV model has proven its 
ability to assist law enforcement organizations in determining the risk of specific threat makers 
and helps to identify the appropriate response to those risks.  As FPS uses a similar 
Comprehensive Risk Assessment model to assess risk of generic threats, it makes logical sense 
that FPS would develop a program to measure the risk associated with specific threats.  FPS 
needs a model that leverages both the criminal investigations and intelligence operations in a 
method that helps to identify the risk of each threat maker.  FPS‟s current inability to evaluate 
the risk associated with these threat makers and to develop a standardized response is alleviated 
by utilizing the behavior based threat assessments.  The CPV model specifically would be of 
great value to FPS as it also supports both court related and non court related mitigation 
strategies for mitigating threats of directed violence.  Even though this project did not have full 
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access to the information needed to validate the CPV model on a case by case basis there is 
strong evidence that this model could be applied easily, with a strong ability to measure its 
effectiveness and identify the best methods for mitigating the threats.  There is a reason that 
many other federal law enforcement agencies are turning to this type of threat assessment; 
however, FPS not only has the ability to implement a similar program but more quickly increase 
the effectiveness of the program due to the large number of threats investigated by the agency. 
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CRITICAL PATH TO VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
This model of the Critical Path To Violence has been adopted from Olson, XXXX who adopted 
the original model from Calhoun 2001. 
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DIRECTED VIOLENCE BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
Quick Reference Guide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directed violence is any act that is committed by a person to harm a specific person or target, examples may include terrorism, threats, 
harassment and stalking.  To be able to better understand and mitigate this type of violence the investigator must know the reasons 
behind the aggression.  Due to the difficulty in prosecuting / mitigating these types of crimes this quick reference guide will help you 
to know which questions to ask and find answers to as you investigate crimes of directed violence.  Think of this type of violence not 
as a single event but as a critical path that an individual choose to travel down that leads to violence.  The psychological reasons are 
too difficult and variable to be easily explained; however the behavior displayed is almost always the same. 
Who – Behavioral Analysis only works when having a suspect to investigate but does not require that an act of violence has happened 
or even that a threat has been made.  If the suspect is not suspected of committing a crime then intelligence operations must be 
coordinated with FBI according to EO 12333.  If there is no specific suspect but a crime has been committed then psychological 
profiling maybe of more help than Behavioral Analysis. 
Grievance – All individuals that act out against a specific target have a reason that they either perceive or were legitimately 
traumatized, or somebody close to them being traumatized by something that the target represents to them.  Generally the suspect 
either has tried to manage the grievance in another form or believes a group has tried all available options and had failed to alleviate 
the stress of the grievance. 
Ideation – At some point the individual expressed interest in violence (not necessarily the exact attack) and felt they received support 
or did not receive condemnation for their views.  With the internet being so prevalent this might be reassurance from anti government 
groups over the internet and direct contact is not necessary.  Language of dominance, morality, justice and culture are strong 
indicators of ideation and maybe found in letters, blogs, ranting, threats or communication with confidants. 
Research & Planning –  This phase requires individuals to expose themselves to the target in order to retrieve information about the 
target.  This is where stalking, harassment, inappropriate questioning and drawing of maps, taking photographs or requests for 
building plans is most likely to be seen.  Suspects that are serious about their planning will have large amounts of both publically 
available and private information.  Targets or individuals around the target may have noticed and even reported suspicious behavior.  
At this point is where the potential for violence becomes very serious to the target, generally unless stopped suspects that move past 
planning carry out their attack.  At this point the suspect has committed both misdemeanor and felony level crimes such as conspiracy 
or threats, trespassing, harassment and privacy violations.  
Preparation –  Includes acquiring weapons, access to the target, transportation to and from the target, and may include dry runs or 
practice attempts.  Suicidal individuals will perform final act behaviors such as destroying their personal property, killing pets, leaving 
letters for loved ones, selling valuables and personal grooming. 
Breach –  This is the last step prior to the attack and is the last possibility for law enforcement and security personnel to stop the 
attacker.  Individual maybe overly protective, shy, sweating, and visibly nervous or many other behaviors that they are attempting to 
conceal their intent.  Individuals found attempting to breach security with a weapon need to be considered very dangerous until a 
behavioral analysis can be conducted and the true intentions known.  
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Example Questions & Appropriate Actions 
Below are questions and actions that investigators should know and perform prior to making decision regarding 
level of seriousness and potential consequences of risks associated with directed violence: 
Who – Why was the subject brought to attention?  Who reported what inappropriate behavior? Who is the subject, experience, 
education, status, experience with weapons, criminal history, physical / mental health issues?  Interview family, friends, teachers, 
employers, religious leaders, peers. Search criminal investigative databases, speak with local law enforcement and mental 
health professionals. 
Grievance – What is the person‟s history of response to traumatic changes in life? Are there additional traumatic changes 
anticipated? Would a potential attack alleviate trauma? What is the likelihood of past life events that caused trauma recurring?   
Ideation – Why is the subject interested in the target? How do others that know the subject view him / her in their environment?  
Does the subject day dream about the attack?  Who is supporting the ideation? How is the subject‟s ideation being supported?  Does 
the suspect believe that the attack will bring about change to a specific cause?  Does the suspect believe the attack would provide 
notoriety, monetary support or create a social change movement?  Does the suspect want to die as part of the attack?   
Research & Planning – What is the subject‟s daily schedule?  How much time to do they devote to planning? How long have 
they been in the planning stages?  What support have they received?  Who are they working with?  What information did he /she gain 
access to?  How can that information be exploited? How does the suspect plan to carry out the attack?  What is the time frame of the 
attack?  Serve search warrant for planning documents, pictures & journals.  Consider placing CI or undercover officer with 
suspect.  Look for documentation that expresses unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel, entry points, access 
controls, perimeter barriers such as fences or walls.  To include pictures / video from discreet or hidden angles, use of disguises for 
getting close to target such as pan handler, vendors or the media, multiple sets of identification, hand drawn sketches or site plans.  
Notes from observation of emergency / security drills or procedures.  Unusual modes of transportation for suspect to get close to 
target.  
Preparation –  What is the subject‟s familiarity with the target and its vulnerabilities.  What is the sophistication of the potential 
attack. What “attack-related” behavior is present?  Has the suspect purchased weapons?  Conducted primary or secondary planning / 
surveillance?  How organized is the subject, can they carry out the plan?  Is what the subject saying corroborated by what they are 
doing? Serve search warrants for materials related to attack, guns, explosives, delivery mechanisms (vehicles), etc.... 
Breach – How well planned was breach?  What were intentions of attack?  How were weapons concealed? How many times has 
suspect gone through breach point?  Are others involved? Detain suspect for crimes related to breaching, then attempt to answer 
above questions, search potentially compromised areas. 
 
Risk Factors of Concern for Attack of Public Officials 
Possession of: Handgun 51%, Rifle / Shotgun 30%, Explosives 8% 
Goal: Harm of target 68%, Attention / notoriety 38%, Suicide 22% 
History of Arrest: No history of arrest 34%, previous arrests as an adult for non violent offense 56%, previous 
arrest involving violence or a weapon 20 / 22%, only 22% served post conviction incarceration 
Weapons Use / Interest (excluding military):  regular use 71%, formal training 19%, fascination with weapons 
38% 
Mental State: at time of attack not delusional 57%, ever treated by mental health professional 61%, history of 
serious depression 44%, history of substance abuse 39% 
Grievance: Towards target 57%, against a government agency 44%,  
Communication: Talked with others about attack 23%, showed interest in history of attacks 44%, 
communication about target 77%, communication with target 23%, History of indirect / conditional / direct 
threats about target 63%, Direct Threat to Target 4% 
80% of attackers plan their attack 
Due to the similarity of goals risk factors for attack on public officials maybe similar to risk factors for attack of government facilities.  
Risk Factors based on Exceptional Case Study Project, National Threat Assessment Center, US Secret Service. 
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Example Training Power Point For Critical Path To Violence 
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